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【書評】
Do Campaigns Matter? The Effect of the Campaign in the 2004 Taiwan Presidential Election

Chia-hung Tsai
Su-feng Cheng
Hsin-hao Huang

Abstract: One of the noteworthy developments in recent Taiwan politics has been the increase and emergence of a mainstream Taiwanese identity. Meanwhile, the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has struggled with a perception of poor economic performance while preparing for an uphill battle with the opposition KMT (Kuomintang)-PFP (People First Party) alliance which promised a swift economic recovery in this year’s presidential election. Under these circumstances, the DPP chose to develop the referendum issue as its main campaign theme, as a means of promoting Taiwanese identity and the value of direct democracy. Our observations would suggest that the referendum issue largely influenced voting pattern while an alternative negative campaign strategy had very little impact. Using surveys administered by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, we were able to examine the variable of respondent support levels to discover that the DPP had successfully attracted people who were also supportive of the two referendums. This finding confirms that the DPP’s campaign strategy had an effect on the outcome of this presidential election.

Introduction

The presidential election in 2000 marked the first time that a transfer of power took place between political parties in Taiwan. The candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Chen Shui-bian, defeated the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Lien Chan and independent candidate James Soong. At the same time, this also effectively ended the 50 years of KMT one-party rule in Taiwan. The DPP has historically leaned towards the long-term goal of Taiwan independence which has often drawn the ire of mainland China; this situation was made worse with Chen’s election, which caused cross-strait relations to reach new lows. The DPP’s first four years in power were marked by many domestic problems in addition to difficulties faced in the arena of international relations. Increasingly tense relations with China have continually caused Taiwan to bear the brunt of pressure from the international community.

These problems all combined to ensure that Chen Shui-bian’s re-election would not be easy. This was especially so because Chen’s two main opponents in 2000, Lien Chan and James Soong, combined forces to oppose the DPP candidate in this year’s election. The two opposition candidates decided to consolidate their two parties’ power and run on the same presidential ticket in an attempt to defeat Chen and the DPP. This strategy, however, did not succeed and raises an important question: how did Chen Shui-bian and the DPP overcome these difficulties and defeat the supposedly superior numbers of the opposition to win the 2004 presidential election?

Our research attempts to determine whether political changes in Taiwan after the 2000 elec-
tion provided Lien and Soong with an environment favorable to their strategic cooperation strategy of "one plus one is greater than or equal to two". At the same time we also use our research to analyze the two competitors' treatment of the two referendum questions held at the same time as the presidential election, negative campaigning tactics, and the attempted assassination of Chen Shui-bian. The Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, began employing rolling sample surveys three months before the election to investigate the significance and effects of these issues on the election's outcome. We also hope that through this research we might be able to explain the role that the parties' election strategies played in determining electoral results.

**Review of Recent Literature Review**

From the perspective of political behavior [KAT1], campaigns are of little importance in that most voters have already made their decisions prior to electoral campaigns. It is argued that partisanship and demographic background determine voting behavior, both of which are prescribed before campaigns (Campbell, Converse, Stokes, and Miller, 1960). According to rational choice theory, voters are more likely to choose the party with the closest issue position to their own. It is less costly and time consuming for voters to rely on party labels instead of collecting their own information on each competing party (Downs, 1957). Therefore, political behavior theory suggests that political parties and social background should be more important than campaigns in determining electoral outcomes. The impact of campaigns is rarely independently determinable because voters have often already used their partisan leanings as a lens through which they perceive events in the political world.

Nevertheless, the impact of campaigns has been well documented. For instance, George Bush described his opponent in the 1988 presidential election—Michael Dukakis as an incompetent liberal candidate and won that election. Four years later, Bill Clinton criticized Bush's poor performance of economy. His slogan: "It's the economy, stupid!" ridiculed the fact that the national economy had stagnated after the Americans had won the 1991 Gulf War.

Essentially, issues are regarded as one of the determinants of voting behavior because they interact with partisanship and candidate evaluations (Page and Jones, 1979). People will respond to campaign issues as long as they are salient and parties take positions on them (Key, 1966). Scholars who examined the 1992 U.S. presidential election suggested that the issue of the economy indeed contributed to Bill Clinton's election victory (Alvarez and Nagler, 1995).

According to Salmore and Salmore (1985), setting the agenda of the campaign is the most important task required to win a majority of votes. They found that candidates who were adept at maintaining their supporters and were able to reach more voters through mass media and other techniques were more successful. They also detailed types of campaign themes and the timing of when they were used. They clearly believe that conducting an effective campaign helps candidates to win elections (Salmore and Salmore, 1985: 191). Their research provides an interesting observation of campaign strategies and candidates.

Reviewing the decline of party voting in the 1980s, Asher (1992) also calls for attention to campaign politics. He argues that the electoral impact of policies is noticeable and that, after reviewing elections in the 1960s and 1970s, candidates and issues jointly acted to determine voter choice. He also projected that campaign is-
issues would become more significant than candidate evaluations, which could be contingent on the context of elections. Candidate-centered campaigns downplay the role of party identification while the impact of issues and candidate personality is diverse across the electoral spectrum.

American election campaigns are candidate-oriented partly because of the presidential system, but can this campaign model be likewise applied to parliamentary systems? If the impact of campaigns overrides party attachment or other psychological factors in parliamentary systems, it would be fair to conclude that election campaigns are indeed important across different political systems.

Bowler and Farrell (1992) point out that a cross-national theoretical framework of campaigns should take inter-system and intra-system differences into account. In this sense, the effect of campaigns may vary from context to context. During their case studies of voter behavior in Germany and Great Britain, Shaun Bowler, David Broughton, Todd Donovan and Joseph Snipp (1992) measure the extent to which election campaigning affects voter choice by modeling the perception of parties and campaign spending. They find that campaign spending as an indicator of campaign effort had a significant impact on voter perceptions of a particular party. Their finding suggests that, all things being equal, election campaigns can shape people's perceptions toward parties.

Kavanagh (1995) examines short-term and long-term forces in election campaigns, noting that in Britain both the Conservative and Labour Party put emphasis on campaign strategies and adopt professional campaigning techniques, including polls, communication skills, and a variety of activities—rallies, speeches, press conferences, broadcasts, and so on. Kavanagh notes that Brit-
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Chen Shui-bian Annette Lu (DPP) % of Vote</th>
<th>James Soong Chang Chao-hsiung (Ind.) % of Vote</th>
<th>Lien Chan Vincent Siew (KMT) % of Vote</th>
<th>Li Ao Elmer Feng (NP) % of Vote</th>
<th>Hsu Hsin-liang Tzu Hueiliang (Ind.) % of Vote</th>
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</table>

Data Source: Central Election Commission

date, then vice-president Lien Chan. Thus, one can see how these internal frictions caused the splintering of the KMT's traditional voter base.

In the beginning Soong received strong voter support, largely as a result of his clean image. Survey data all showed that his support numbers were higher than the other two candidates. This phenomenon also caused confusion among KMT supporters as they faced difficulty in deciding which candidate, Lien or Soong, to choose. In the last three months of the election, however (beginning December, 1999), the KMT alleged that Soong, while serving as the KMT party secretary, had embezzled over $100NT million which he had then deposited in an offshore bank account located in the United States. Although Soong continuously denied these allegations, he, in the end, was unable to provide any single clear and effective response to the issue. Simultaneously the DPP exposed that Soong's family owned five large properties in the United States. These allegations, which became known as the Chung Hsing Bills Scandal, seriously damaged Soong's image as a clean and honest candidate and caused his support numbers to gradually fall.

In addition to using the KMT split and the Soong scandals to successfully undercut the power base of the two candidates, the DPP was also able to focus attention on the issue of KMT corruption throughout the election campaign.
This was a very damaging issue for the KMT as it was very resonant with voters. The DPP also focused on the historical suppression of democracy, as well as the oppression of native Taiwanese consciousness witnessed at the hands of the KMT during the period of one-party rule. The DPP was able to use these three issues effectively to urge voters that a change in governing party was needed. The DPP was also able to position itself as a clean alternative supportive of democratic development and representative of native Taiwanese consciousness, emphasizing a love for Taiwan. The results of the 2000 election found Chen Shui-bian winning with 39.3% of the vote while James Soong captured 36.8% and Lien Chan only was able to secure 23.1%. Thus, Soong fell short of Chen by only 3% of the vote.

Table 1 shows the 2000 presidential election candidate performance results for each one in every electoral district of Taiwan. The results show clearly that if votes cast for Lien and Soong were combined in each district, with the exception of Chen Shui-bian’s hometown Tainan, they would have surpassed Chen’s vote totals. Therefore there was a general perception that Chen’s victory was a result of the traditional KMT voting base being split between Lien and Soong. Another factor worth noting is the strength of Chen’s support in southern Taiwan which was consistently stronger than Soong’s. The opposite was true in the north, where Soong captured large amounts of support from Hakka voters. His support was especially strong in Taoyuan, Hsinchu, and Miaoli districts. In Taiwan’s center Soong garnered more support than Chen although the differential in votes was not as great as that witnessed in either the north or south. On the other hand, Chen’s margin of victory in the south allowed him to overcome his poor showing in the north. These results show that levels of DPP support in the south were clearly higher than in the north. Thus, it can be said that the south could be labeled as Chen, or “green”, territory, while the north could be similarly labeled as Soong, or “blue”, territory.

Changes in Taiwan’s Political Environment After the 2000 Presidential Election

After the 2000 presidential election, there was a realignment of political parties in Taiwan, as well as a shift in the environment in which these parties operated. While James Soong had only lost by a margin of 2.5%, the largest party’s candidate, Lien Chan of the KMT, had only been able to capture 23.1% of the vote. This result led supporters of the KMT to accuse Lee Teng-hui of secretly helping Chen Shui-bian, thus causing Lien’s poor performance. This group also blamed Soong’s “betrayal” for their candidate’s poor results. Two days after the election’s conclusion many people gathered in front of the KMT’s headquarters demanding that Lee Teng-hui assume responsibility for the presidential loss, and for party reform. Lien Chan used these demands to force Lee Teng-hui to step down as leader of the KMT, with Lien assuming control of the party. For his part, Soong decided to formally leave the KMT and establish a new political party composed of some KMT and New Party (NP) legislators. This party assumed the name of the People’s First Party (PFP). The NP, at the time of its original split from the KMT in 1994, was largely viewed as a party of Mainlanders. The creation of the PFP, to some extent, also represented a new split between Mainlander and native-Taiwanese factions within the KMT. As a result, the PFP to some extent inherited the NP’s image as a party of Mainlanders.

After he was forced to step down as KMT leader, Lee Teng-hui left the KMT and founded the
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2001. Lee’s new party was formed around, and drew supporters from, the belief in a Taiwanese consciousness, in addition to Lee’s personal charisma and appeal. In the National Legislative elections later that year the TSU was able to garner 7.8% of votes cast to win 13 seats (out of 225). Thus Lee’s party was able to establish a position in the Taiwanese political landscape.

Although it would seem that there were many different political parties in Taiwan after the 2000 presidential election, in reality there were only two blocs in terms of ideology; with the KMT, PFP, and NP representing the “pan-blue” camp, and the DPP and TSU representing the “pan-green” camp. In regard to the Taiwan independence issue the DPP and TSU can be seen as leaning towards independence, while the KMT, PFP, and NP favor a position of unification with Mainland China (Figure 1). According to individual party support levels, Figure 2 indicates that 35-45% of respondents did not support any particular party. Around 30% of respondents identified themselves as “pan-green” supporters, slightly lower than those who acknowledged support for the “pan-blue” camp. After the DPP assumed control of the government, however, support levels for the “pan-green” began to exhibit an upward trend. Today, although the DPP is considered the party of government, they only control 87 seats in the National Legislative Yuan.

Even when this total is combined with the 13 seats occupied by the DPP’s ally, the TSU, one discovers that the “pan-green” currently holds only 106 seats in the National Legislative Yuan, while, on the other hand, the “pan-blues” currently have 115 seats (KMT 68, PFP 46, NP 1).

Lien Chan and James Soong: Is “1+1 ≥ 2”? 
As there was a general feeling that Chen’s 2000 victory was largely attributable to vote-splitting, Lien Chan and James Soong both believed that their ambitions could still be realized in the 2004 presidential election. Although Lien and Soong had conducted serious personal attacks on each other during the 2000 presidential campaign, and despite the fact that Soong had started his own competing party, supporters within the “pan-blue” camp began to call for them to join forces in order to provide a united front against the “pan-greens”. Some factors that led toward greater cooperation were the poor performance of the DPP administration, a perceived popular dissatisfaction with Chen Shui-bian’s personal style of governing, as well as increasingly unstable cross-strait relations with mainland China. Thus, internal and external factors were seen as being conducive to a rise of the “pan-blue” camp in 2004.

Internally, the DPP government lacked experience during its first four years in power and, as a result, satisfaction with the government’s overall
performance was not high. According to survey data from 2002 to 2004 (Table 2), over half of those questioned were not satisfied with overall government achievement. Within the last four years Taiwan's economic performance has been in clear decline. This has caused many people to doubt the DPP's ability to govern effectively. Moreover, Chen Shui-bian's personal governing style has drawn lots of criticism and mistrust from those questioned.

External pressures also increased during Chen's first term in office due to the pro-independence leanings of the President and the DPP, which caused the Chinese government to refuse to have any dealings with Taiwan over economic or political matters and led to a deadlock in cross-strait relations. These tensions have considerably affected Taiwan's recent economic development. Moreover, tensions have increased since Chen Shui-bian's theory of "one country on each side" was made public. This statement has even contributed to social instability within Taiwan [KAT2]. These factors, when combined with the internal factors mentioned above, naturally led Lien and Soong to believe that the situation was ripe for success should they unite. They were also especially confident due to the fact that the DPP had never captured over 50% of the popular vote in any national election. Therefore it was believed that if the "pan-blues" combined forces in the 2004 presidential election they would be able to defeat the "pan-greens".

In reality, however, did the so-called "1+1 ≥ 2" theory prove to be true? If the combination of the two parties the KMT's and PFP's bases and their respective growth and decline are investigated, while also factoring in the development of a Taiwanese group consciousness, then perhaps this theory might not be so simply accepted. Since the PFP was a splinter of the KMT and their
party ideologies are related, or similar, their voter bases would accordingly overlap. In the council and legislative elections the largest head to head competitors were the KMT and PFP. In addition, the PFP captured 46 seats in the National Legislative Yuan after its inception, compared to the KMT’s 68 seats. These results were not only fairly close, but also threatening to the KMT. In addition, during the 2000 presidential election, Lien and Soong had each staged vicious personal attacks against each other. Although the two sincerely desired to cooperate in this year’s election, they nonetheless still had many personal and political differences. These differences provided the DPP with many opportunities to play the two off against each other.

The changing power relationship between political parties is depicted in Figure 2. Although 35-45% of Taiwanese voters did not indicate support for any particular party, the DPP’s support levels were seen to be on the rise after they had assumed the responsibilities of government. This increase was not sudden or large, but has been consistent and steady. This was not the case for the “pan-blue” camp which had endured the split that had created the PFP. Their overall support levels had not risen, and were, in fact, about the same as before the PFP had left the KMT, at around the 35% mark. These results would suggest that “pan-blue” support remained the same as before the KMT-PFP split with voters floating between either of the three “blue” parties, the KMT, PFP, or NP. Thus, one can see that the “pan-blue” camp failed to attract any new bases of support. If a party is not able to attract new supporters it can prove to be very disadvantageous to that party. On the other hand, the “pan-green” parties, the DPP and TSU, who also share similar ideologies and thus have the potential for overlapping voter bases, were able to register growth in their support levels in the same time period that had seen “pan-blue” stagnation. This would indicate that the “pan-green” camp did indeed have something that allowed it to attract voters to its cause. The growth of the “pan-green” camp can be seen through the 2001 National Legislative Yuan election results (Table 3). The “pan-green” camp was able to add 30 seats to its Legislative seat total compared to the 1998 elections, and their percentage of the popular vote increased by 11.6%. The “pan-blue” camp’s seat totals, on the other hand, were reduced by 19, while they lost 3.7% of the popular vote. Thus, if either seat totals or popular vote is examined one can see that the “pan-blue” camp is clearly in decline. Therefore, although the 2000 presidential election saw Lien and Soong capture 59.9% of votes cast it was also clear that the power of the “pan-blue” camp was in decline. With these statistics in mind, the assumption that the two, in cooperation, could equal their previous vote totals in the 2004 presidential election is questionable at best.

Another factor that needs to be examined is
the development of Taiwanese consciousness, as shown in Figure 3. Throughout the last decade this identity has changed dramatically. Those who identify themselves as Taiwanese has increased from 17.3% to 43.2% during this period, while those who identify themselves as Chinese has dropped from 26.2% to 7.7% over the same period. The reasons behind these dramatic changes might be a combination of Taiwan’s internal factors and external pressure. Beginning in the 1970s Taiwan began a slow movement of indigenization and political democratization that might have contributed to the development of internal factors conducive to an emerging Taiwanese identity. Meanwhile, Taiwan and China have been de facto separated for over forty years and each side has developed politically and economically independent of the other. This has been especially the case since the 1970s as democratic reforms have been put in place in Taiwan. In addition to the fact that modern Taiwanese cannot accept integration into mainland China’s current authoritarian political system, Taiwan’s new generations have had little experience or contact with mainland China. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that these people would have a greater attachment to Taiwan. Beside this, when the KMT originally came to Taiwan they attempted to suppress the local native Taiwanese cultural and political elites. During democratization, however, the Taiwanese elites began to dominate mainland elements within the political sphere. The suppression of local culture and identity was no longer possible within this context. This trend accelerated and took hold especially after the promotion of Lee Teng-hui and his “Localization Faction” in the 1980s, which led to the acceptance of “Taiwanization” as a mainstream value. Externally, mainland China has continually attacked Taiwan in the media, while also attempt-
ing to intimidate Taiwan through the use and show of military force. Internationally China has also consistently attempted to isolate Taiwan through diplomatic pressure and boycotts. This has caused many in Taiwan to resent China and its actions while also promoting a Taiwanese consciousness that is rooted in the belief that China and Taiwan are indeed two states. This awareness has led to a feeling of the need for Taiwan to mark out its own international space. The development and protection of a Taiwanese consciousness has always been one of the main goals of the DPP. Therefore, the increase in the strength of Taiwanese consciousness has also meant an increase in strength for the DPP. The “pan-blue” parties, on the other hand, who have closer relationships with mainlanders in Taiwan, have had a harder time developing a consistent policy towards this emerging Taiwanese consciousness at points they have even tried to ignore it altogether. For example, Lien Chan, who is ethnically Taiwanese, is commonly perceived as a mainlander, while Soong actively participated in earlier attempts by the then-governing KMT to suppress the development of local Taiwanese culture. Therefore their cooperation in an environment where Taiwanese consciousness represented mainstream opinion proved to be a very difficult proposition due to past perceptions that were hard to overcome.

Among the advantages the “pan-blue” camp could count on in the 2004 presidential election were the numerous difficulties faced by the DPP going into the election, including a poor record of achievement since taking power, criticism of Chen Shui-bian’s personal governing style, and perceived social instability. If some of the other factors already discussed, however, are included in our examination such as a combined KMT-PFP voter base, the declining power of the “pan-blue” political parties and the development of a Taiwanese consciousness, then many doubts emerge concerning the main assumption underpinning Lien and Soong’s cooperation—that “one plus one is greater than or equal to two”. In regard to the DPP, although the past four years have dealt the party many setbacks, they have been able to rely on the issue of Taiwanese consciousness to appeal to potential supporters. As a result, their levels of support have gradually increased. In addition the DPP proved adept at agenda-setting during the election campaign, while also possessing the advantages inherent in being the incumbent party. Therefore, although the electorate generally believed that the “pan-blue” camp had a better chance to win the election, the analysis provided above demonstrates the obstacles to effective cooperation between the two candidates. In the end it could be concluded that a DPP loss to a “pan-blue” ticket was not a given, as many had previously assumed, and that in fact both camps were about evenly matched.

In the 2004 election both the “pan-greens” and “pan-blues” had their advantages and weaknesses. Their campaign strategies were designed to maximize advantages, while downplaying their respective weaknesses. The following section analyzes how each group attempted to control the issues through their own particular election campaign strategies, as well as the effects of their tactics.

**Campaign Strategy-The Referendum Issue Took Command**

The opposition parties’ cooperation was a large challenge for the incumbent, Chen Shui-bian. In previous nation-wide elections the DPP had never been able to win over 50% of the vote, reaching a high of 40%. In addition, this time around, Chen did not have the advantage of facing
a divided opponent. In this coming election, the competition would be more intense than four years earlier. In this section, we will first analyze both campaigns, attempting to identify their themes, backgrounds, and formulations. We will also explain how the DPP effectively controlled the emerging referendum issue as they assumed the position of agenda setter during the election campaign. The effects of negative campaigning will also be analyzed, as well as the overall integration of both sides’ media campaigns. Lastly, both sides’ reaction to the 3/19 shooting will also be investigated.

Formulating a Campaign Theme

The main rationale of a campaign theme is to provide potential supporters with a cognitive shortcut that allows voters to ignore many of the distractions and alternative messages being aired during an election campaign. As well, a campaign theme represents or symbolizes a candidate’s ideas, moral stands, or vision of the future. Since April 2003 the “pan-blue” alliance had already decided in principle that the 2000 competitors, Lien and Soong, would cooperate and join forces for the 2004 election campaign. By August of the same year they formally presented themselves and their campaign teams to the public. In comparison, the incumbent Chen Shui-bian was not officially re-nominated to run as a candidate until December, 2003. Before December, however, he was able to use his status as a sitting president to begin preparing for his campaign by touring the country on a variety of inspection tours and other publicity-related events.

The “pan-greens” formulated a campaign theme that centered on the slogan “Believe in Taiwan, Insist on Reform”. Throughout the previous four years the DPP’s attempts at reform had yielded little real achievement, and Chen’s job approval rating was correspondingly low. Overall, the DPP’s performance in office was lackluster. Meanwhile, the international economy had hit hard times, performing poorly. Taiwan’s economy was unable to escape this global trend and recession soon hit the island. Thus, the DPP was unable to use its record in government in its first term to attract voters. Instead, the party tried to focus on its traditional association with notions such as a Taiwan-centric consciousness and continued institutional reforms. These two campaign themes were not unexpected given their ability to attract votes and the fact that they were traditional core values of the DPP. Chen used the following three slogans to symbolize his presidential campaign, “One country on each side vs. One China,” “Democratic Reform vs. Corruption Restoration,” and “Believe in Taiwan vs. Misery for Taiwan.”

The “pan-blue” camp issued their slogan “Improving the Economy, Establishing Peace, and Saving Taiwan” as a jumping-off point for their campaign as usual. This strategy was an effective tool based on the belief that the opposition could benefit from attacking the government on its poor record of achievements. The “pan-blue” camp was trying to capitalize on its past performance while in government. They also wanted to establish that the “pan-blues” were the choice of “ability”. The KMT wanted to highlight that the economy had stagnated for three years under the DPP, and that with their previous economic experience only the “pan-blues” would be able to resuscitate it. Secondly, the “pan-blues” sought to highlight the lack of flexibility shown by the DPP in handling cross-strait affairs during their term in office. The “pan-blues” sought to use the previous four years of cross-strait deadlock as a centerpiece of their strategy. Many business leaders and entrepreneurs had been calling for the so-
called "Three Direct Links" with Mainland China. Thus, the second theme of the "pan-blue" campaign was the ideal of "Establishing Peace". Lastly, the KMT did not want the DPP to be able to monopolize the theme of "Loving Taiwan," and therefore adopted the corresponding theme "Saving Taiwan" in an effort to demonstrate their Taiwanese consciousness.

How Referendums Became the Election’s Central Issue

The election itself is a competition for sending the message to the electorate. If a party can set the election agenda it can gain significant media attention and exposure. Using the media to transmit a party’s message to potential voters is a useful and effective means of garnering support. It is possible to compare and contrast the competing campaign strategies to identify each of the camp’s main strategy and tactics. The "pan-greens," realizing that Taiwanese consciousness was on the rise, concentrated their campaign on developing themes of "continued reform" and "loving Taiwan," while the "pan-blue" camp adopted a strategy that focused on retrospective thinking which highlighted the poor performance and lack of achievements of the government, while claiming that they possessed a more capable and experienced administrative team better able to tackle the political and economic problems faced by Taiwan.

Next we will investigate how the referendum became a central campaign issue in the election, and each camp’s response to the emergence of this issue will also be analyzed. The referendum issue first appeared in November of 2003 during a transit stop in America by Chen Shui-bian. At this time Chen declared that he would make plans to hold a referendum and develop a new constitution in Taiwan. The referendum law then received three readings in the National Legislative Yuan to be confirmed as law. It was during this process that the issue of referendums became an issue of national importance as controversy erupted over the two proposed referendum topics. Undoubtedly the DPP was able to successfully use the referendum issue to gain agenda setting power over the presidential election campaign. The opposition "pan-blue" camp had attempted to use the economy as their campaign theme, but by mid-2003 an economic recovery was clearly underway, and voters’ attention had already begun to drift elsewhere.

The utmost among the "pan-green" campaign strategies was to propose that a referendum be used to help create a new constitution. Through this proposition the "pan-green" camp was able to attract a diverse group of supporters whose only shared goal was that of Taiwan independence. This call did not, however, hold much attraction for the majority of voters who prefer the status quo. American President Bush also came out in opposition to a referendum aimed at constructing a new constitution. Using a referendum to determine the country’s status and sovereignty also drew immense pressure even from Taiwan’s major allies: the United States and Japan. Ultimately, using the referendum as a symbol of democracy, however, was seen as more able to generate voter agreement and support. This trend was fully reflected within the Legislative Yuan as it drafted the referendum law. It was perhaps with the election in mind that the "pan-blue" camp wanted to show its support for democratization and allowed the referendum law to pass its three readings with little difficulty, but at the same time the Legislative Yuan moved to block actions towards using the referendum for either moves toward independence, or creating a new constitution. At the same time, however,
both the government and opposition passed an article in the referendum law allowing for a "defensive referendum" to be called. At this point we can clearly see the multiple changes in the DPP’s strategic use of the referendum issue. When Chen Shui-bian first introduced the idea of a referendum as a means of constructing a new constitution, this was simply a means to an end, as Chen’s real aim was the creation of a new constitution and not the development of a referendum as a democratic tool. As Chen’s plan to develop a new constitution drew intense criticism he began to shift his focus to the issue of referendums, and away from drafting a new constitution. Thus, the “pan-green” camp was forced to devise a strategy that took this issue into account. From the point of view of controlling the agenda, as well as the use of democratic symbols, one can see that the DPP was very successful.

Although the final version of the referendum law eliminated any votes that might address the nation’s status or sovereignty, Chen Shui-bian nevertheless was able to use the “defensive referendum” clause within the referendum law as the legal basis for calling the referendum. Chen cited China's gradually increasing missile threat against Taiwan as a very dangerous situation compromising the island's safety. As a result, he proposed two peace referendums whose affirmative answers called for “strengthening national defense” and “equal negotiations with China”. During the campaign, Chen advocated the stance that voting against the propositions would be two simultaneous blows against both reform and democracy. He accused those who stood against holding the referendum of selling out Taiwan. The “pan-blue” camp, on the other hand, attempted to cast doubt on the appropriateness of the referendum, while also countering that the DPP was simply using the referendum as a campaign strategy.

The two camps’ campaign attacks reached a crescendo when both held huge rallies in the two weeks leading up to Election Day. The DPP’s cross-island rally was dubbed the “2/28 Hand in Hand Rally,” while the KMT held the “3/13 Changing The President to Save Taiwan Rally.” The former’s stated purpose was the guarding of “Taiwanese consciousness” and saying no to China. Meanwhile, former president Lee Teng-hui also appealed for “Localizing Taiwan’s Politics.” The latter “pan-blue” rally was aimed at highlighting “Chen Shui-Bian’s achievement, personal characteristics and scandals.” Both rallies attracted people in the millions. To this extent, it would seem that the election campaign had become a war between those “Defending Taiwan’s Central Consciousness” and those “Against Chen Shui-bian.”

It cannot be repudiated that DPP was successfully able to make the referendum the central issue of this election. The referendum was significant, not only because of the civil rights it would bestow and its opportunity to deepen direct democratic practice, but also because it represented the voice of a Taiwan-centric consciousness. Since “Taiwanese consciousness” had become part of the political mainstream in Taiwan, the referendum issue could be viewed as a question of “Taiwanese/Chinese identification.” No matter what way those living on Taiwan would care to classify themselves as Taiwanese or both Chinese and Taiwanese-they would certainly possess some level of desire to take part in the referendum. Secondly, as the first referendum in Taiwan’s history, it was symbolically significant for the island’s legacy of democratic reform. When compared with the “pan-green,” one discovers that the “pan-blue” was unable to develop a consistent position in regard to the referendum,
and thus lost its ability to lead or frame the referendum issue in a beneficial manner. Hence, it can be said that the "pan-greens" were successful in their attempts to use the referendum as a tool to stake their claim as the true representatives of "Taiwan's consciousness" while also appearing as the leaders of Taiwan's reform movement.

The Effects of Negative Campaigning

In addition to the campaign strategies already discussed, the candidates or parties also resorted to negative campaign attacks whereby an opponent's personal weakness or policy mistakes would come under scrutiny during the election campaign. As this type of campaigning was present in this year's election it would be prudent to discuss its effect on the election. In this section both camps' use of negative television advertising will be investigated. In addition, the effects of these negative advertising campaigns on the election will also be discussed.

With respect to campaign advertising in this election, both the "pan-blue" and "pan-green" employed extensive negative advertising campaigns which were aimed at questioning and creating doubts about the morals, characters, beliefs, and capabilities of the opposing sides' candidate. Out of all campaign-related ads, over 52% were negative in nature. This finding shows that both camps were serious about negative campaign strategies. The "pan-blue" camp focused on attacking the governing party's relationship with big business and the Chen Shui-bian administration's lack of achievements. The "pan-blue" commercials especially targeted the economy and educational reform policy. The "pan-green" camp, meanwhile, attacked Lien Chan's record of achievement from when he had previously served in the government, in addition to raising questions about his personal character and questionable family finances. The "greens" also delved into the KMT's party finances and assets. During this election, however, a major scandal, similar to the 2000 Chung Hsing Bills Scandal, failed to emerge. Negative attacks were definitely able to cause damage to the individual candidates. Particular attacks focused on the stock transactions of Chen Shui-bian's wife, Wu Shu-chen, who was accused of insider trading, as well as the political donations Chen received from wanted fugitive Chen Yu-hao. These negative advertising strategies would have had some kind of adverse effect on the levels of "pan-green" support. However, as a result of Chen apologizing for his wife's dealings in a nationally televised debate, the first set of attacks did not gain resonance with voters and did not become a serious issue in the campaign. The Chen Yu-hao affair also failed to materialize as a major issue due to the fact that it was eclipsed on the day before the election by the attempted assassination of President Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu.

The 319 Assassination Attempt: Shockwaves and Repercussions

Most research admits that the importance of large impact events can effect any election. A day before the election President Chen was campaigning in Tainan, his hometown, when two bullets were fired at him while he was inside his jeep waving to supporters. In the past, research has found that the victim of an assassination attempt, whether successful or not, will benefit electorally through a psychological reaction of revenge or sympathy from voters (Crotty, 1998). In this explosive atmosphere the occurrence of the shooting proved very advantageous for Chen Shui-bian.

We can superficially discuss both camps' reaction to the shooting incident. After closer in-
spection it was found that Chen was not seriously wounded. The “pan-greens” initial reaction was to take the President to the hospital at approximately 2:00pm. Later on that evening a statement was issued canceling all further “pan-green” campaign activities. There was another short statement delivered around 11:00pm. The main purpose of the “pan-green” strategy was to generate sympathy support for their candidate. The “pan-blue” camp was initially unaware of the severity of the attack on Chen, as communication between the two camps was unclear. In addition to quickly halting their campaign activities as well, they began to question the authenticity of the assassination. The blue camp tried to counter the sympathy effect of the shooting. The fact that the “pan-blues” also had to cancel all campaign activities allowed Chen Shui-bian to enjoy unfettered press coverage during the crucial period right up until voting commenced. This “pan-blue” blackout facilitated the spreading of the sympathy effect for Chen. Thus, Lien Chan was not able to receive equal exposure. In addition, if they had immediately questioned the shooting it would have appeared inappropriate and most likely generated a negative backlash against the “pan-blue” campaign. Throughout the campaign the “pan-green’s” most important strategy had been stressing their promotion of a “Taiwanese consciousness,” and now that the assassination attempt had taken place, they were able to provide the public with an authentic “Taiwanese President” being attacked, thus reinforcing the perceived battle of Taiwanese to assert control over their own destiny. At the same time the shooting also had the effect of mobilizing people to go to the polls and cast their votes. Thus, the sympathy effect generated from the attack and the “pan-blues” failure to appropriately manage events surrounding the shooting definitely had some level of effect on the outcome of the presidential election.

Through the analysis conducted above we think that at the outset of the campaign Chen Shui-bian was an under-dog, not expected to win. In the end, however he was able to emerge victorious. He was successfully able to set the agenda for the election campaign through the use of the referendum issue. He was also successfully able to combine feelings of group identity with the referendum issue as well. In this manner he was able to consistently increase his base of support as election day approached. The 3/19 assassination attempt effectively pushed Chen over the top and allowed him to claim victory in the election the next day.

Dynamics of Public Opinions during the Campaign

The rolling sample surveys conducted by the Election Study Center allowed us to keep track of the dynamics of candidate preferences dating back to last November. There were at least 400 respondents interviewed each week. Although the sampling error was +/-5%, the results were able to reflect the influence of campaign issues upon those questioned.

Figure 4 shows that the proportion of the sample supporting Lien Chan and Chen Shui-bian. We saw that in the beginning of the survey period Lien had taken the lead; with his support levels at 35.9 percent in November with Chen trailing by 7 percent. Throughout the election campaign Chen was continually regarded as the underdog despite the fact that he was the incumbent.

The proportion of Lien’s support, however began to drop as Chen’s campaign began to gear up and his supporters began to rally around him after he was officially nominated in December. The gap between both candidates continued to shrink as, on January 16, two months before the Elec-
tion Day, Chen revealed two referendum ques-
tions and announced that the referendums were
to be held simultaneously with the presidential
election. At this time support for Chen and Li-
en, taking into account the 5% sampling error,
was almost even among decided voters.

The DPP began to promote the referendums
as the main theme of its campaign strategy
almost immediately after the two referendum
questions had been initiated. For instance, former
DPP chairman Frank Hsieh said that even if the
referendums failed they would at least deliver a
message to the international community that the
people of Taiwan are split on their future. The
high turnout for the “2/28 Hand-in-Hand” rally
boosted support for Chen as over two million
people reportedly attended this peaceful protest
against China’s military threat. The “human
chain” composed of an estimated one million par-
ticipants also acted to strengthen the DPP’s call
for referendums. As a result, by the fourteenth
week of the campaign, the DPP ticket managed
to surpass the “pan-blue” alliance for the first
time in sample surveys.

Throughout the next two weeks, while both
camps claimed to have taken the lead, the elec-
tion result was still too close to call. The influ-
ence of the assassination attempt the day before
the election proved to be very decisive. The inci-
dent may have stolen Lien’s victory, but that
would not have been possible if the two candi-
dates had not been already running neck and
neck.

In Section 3, we attempted to establish the be-

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Data Source: Election Study Center.
the same vote share was a myth. One of the points made there was that the issue of national identity was a salient variable in this election and that people who identified themselves as Taiwanese had been increasing throughout the 1990s. On one hand, the DPP has been traditionally regarded as the party representing Taiwanese; while on the other hand, the referendum itself was considered a challenge to China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China, and could therefore be seen as an assertion of Taiwanese identity. As a result, the variable of national identity could be used as an indicator of support for either camp. Thus, one would expect that levels of Taiwanese identification would reflect DPP electoral performance.

Figure 5 demonstrates that the increase of Taiwanese identity during the campaign period was nearly identical to support levels registered for the DPP. At the end of last November, the level of Taiwanese identity was very close to that of Chinese/Taiwanese identity. These data were subsequently treated as a baseline for comparison. Four weeks later, the level of the Taiwanese identity had risen, coinciding with the announcement of the referendum questions. The “228 Hand-in-Hand” rally in the fourteenth week boosted Taiwanese national identity again. Thereafter, one can see that the percentage of those identifying themselves as Taiwanese increased steadily toward the end of the election.

The issue of whether or not to actually vote in the referendum was also clearly related to the national identity issue. The “pan-blue” camp denounced the DPP initiated referendums as nothing more than a campaign strategy. They argued that the two referendums did not conform to the Referendum Law, and as such recommended not voting in such an “illegal” action. The context of this election and its accompanying referendums suggest that people were highly divided over whether they should cast referendum ballots or not, therefore it was widely believed that people who supported the KMT-PFP alliance would not turn out to vote in the referendums, while DPP supporters would do the opposite. Moreover, we felt that people who identified themselves as Taiwanese would be more likely to cast referendum ballots because of the strong sentiment of self-determination that is as-
Figure 6  Change in Referendums Support during the 2004 Election Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/17</th>
<th>1/26</th>
<th>1/31</th>
<th>2/6</th>
<th>2/14</th>
<th>2/21</th>
<th>2/28</th>
<th>3/06</th>
<th>3/13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ▲ Pick up the ballot  - ■ not pick up the ballot

Data Source: Election Study Center.

associated with Taiwanese identity. People who identify themselves as Chinese would most likely prefer not to vote; while those with dual identity were faced with a new kind of choice-referendum participation, to vote or not to vote.

A strong tie between respective national identity and referendum participation has been shown in Figure 6. The proportion of people who stated a desire to vote in the referendum was initially higher than that of those who refused to cast ballots when Chen had first announced the referendums. Later on in February, as efforts by the "pan-blue" camp to encourage a referendum boycott increased, anti-referendum opinions began to rise accordingly. After the "2/28 Hand-in-Hand" rally, however, support for the referendums skyrocketed to 60 percent, while at the same time anti-referendum opinion plunged to less than 40 percent prior to the election. Compared to Figure 5, Figure 6 simply shows how people felt about the referendums, but the dynamic of the issue appears to demonstrate that there was great variation of the choice of whether or not to support the referendums over the period leading up to the election.

Do campaigns matter? Whether or not a campaign issue can help a party reach out to the electorate is a very critical consideration for all political practitioners. As for political scientists, however, it is difficult to evaluate the success or effectiveness of a campaign strategy in the real world (Stokes, 1981). To assess the influence of the campaign strategy, we assumed that people who promised to cast referendum ballots would vote for Chen due to the intense controversy over this issue as well as because of the inherent tension between the two competing national identities. Based on this assumption, we conducted a cross-tabular analysis to see if people indeed transferred their support to the DPP because of the referendums. Figure 7 shows this result, in which the proportion of support for
Chen among the people who wanted to cast referendum ballots increased after the 2/28 rally.

Among those intending to cast referendum ballots, an increase of 2.8 percent in support of the Chen ticket can be seen, while that of the Lien ticket dropped by 9.6 percent. Simultaneously, the percentage of those undecided increased by 8.3 percent. We speculate that some people who had earlier decided to vote for Lien changed their minds because of the referendum issue; they may have eventually opted for Chen or pondered the two candidates at the last minute. In either case, Chen’s campaign strategy, using the referendum issue to attract the likely KMT voters, was resoundingly successful.

Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a chronology of the election campaign and pointed out the campaign themes of both candidates. We have also contended that the DPP disproved the myth of “one plus one is greater than or equal to two” through the use of the national identity issue. The DPP was able to capitalize on the sentiment of Taiwanese identity and create campaign momentum through the promotion of the two referendums. As both camps were engaged in sling mud at each other, the effect of negative campaign tactics was not significant. The issue of the referendum proved to be the main battlefield during this election, and many rallies, debates, and media campaigns evolved around this issue.

Our empirical analyses confirm the effect the referendum issue had on the election. On the basis of the rising Taiwanese identity, the DPP was indeed able to use the referendums to attract potential KMT supporters. The DPP definitely delivered a clear message that it put national identity before all other issues, and increases in Taiwanese identity after the 2/28 rally only served to make the referendum issue even more appealing. On the other side, the KMT’s allegations against the DPP that the referendums were merely a campaign gimmick proved unconvincing to the electorate. Instead, we have shown that some voters probably changed their votes due to the referendum controversy; likely aiding the DPP ticket as it was associated with the referendums.

According to Kanavagh (1995), an election result is the product of long-term and short-term forces in a campaign. Running as an incumbent, Chen managed to make inroads in some specific counties and traditional strongholds of the KMT, thus swaying some crucial support his way. He also emphasized the importance of the south, a region long overlooked by the previous KMT administrations. The DPP’s strategic appeal to national identity, however, should be viewed as the most critical factor in the election outcome. In his comments on this election outcome, former Chinese student movement leader, Wang Dan, pointed out that “[t]he pan-green camp’s vote has jumped from 40 percent in 2000 to 50 percent this year, showing that a feeling of Taiwanese identity has expanded...If Beijing and Washington
were not convinced about this trend four years ago, then they should be now.”\(^{(2)}\) Wang’s observation succinctly summarizes the major dynamics of national identity in Taiwan.

It can thus be argued that the electoral campaign strategies of the two camps may indeed have altered the result of this presidential election. Our observations and analyses support this assumption and indicate that the referendum issue was a critical determining factor in this election. In the future more attention should be paid to investigating whether or not electoral campaigns strategy are becoming increasingly important, leading to issue voting in elections and a corresponding decline in party identification.

+ Paper delivered at the annual conference of Japanese Association of Electoral Studies. We thank Kazuo Asano’s comments and suggestions.

(1) In addition, Li Ao was a candidate for the NP and received 0.13% of the vote, while independent candidate Hsu Hsin-liang received 0.63% of the vote.

(2) In Taiwan the color green represents DPP while blue represents KMT.

(3) The Presidential Secretary was also the DPP’s presidential campaign manager, this election campaign was a very cut-throat affair. The “pan-blues” led the “pan-greens for most of the campaign 55% to 45%. Thus, 6% of votes cast would total approximately 600,000 actual votes, which would have guaranteed victory. China Times, Sep. 28, 2003, page 2.


(6) From 2000 to 2004 the Taiwanese economy grew at an annual rate of about 2.6%, but in 2001 the economy shrank by 2.2%; in comparison, when the KMT was in power the economy grew at an annual rate of 4.5%. From 2000 unemployment rose by 2.0%, reaching 5.0% in 2003. From these statistics it is clear that the DPP has had a much poorer economic record than the KMT. Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs website:

(7) Liberty Times, Dec. 11, 2003, page 5

(8) China Times, Nov. 3, 2003, page 1

(9) The Central Election Commission hosted a series of 10 referendum debates between a representative of the government and those opposing the referendum, including media personalities. These debates took place between Feb 29-Mar 15. These debates became the main focal point of the election campaign.

(10) China Times, Dec. 9, 2003, page 2

(11) Time Magazine, Asian Edition used “Brave, but probably not practical” to describe Chen’s referendum and constitution plans. They also stated that this bet might ruin Taiwan’s political fortunes and cause a political storm. United Daily News, Dec. 13, 2003, page 13. In December, former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and Japanese envoy Katsuhisa Uchida visited Taiwan, passing a message to Chen during their low-profile trips. Mori voiced the Japanese government’s concern over the referendum plan. Uchida expressed a similar concern over the referendum plan and hoped that Chen would handle the referendum issue carefully.

(12) According to Referendum Law Article 17 the President may call a referendum for defensive purposes if the nation or its sovereignty is under direct threat. China Times, Nov. 28, 2003, page 1.


(14) Vice-Presidential candidate Annette Lu stated that those who voted “yes” in the referendum would also vote for Chen and Lu in the election, so they not only would be elected, but would also receive a large percentage of the total vote. United Daily News, Feb. 1, 2004, page 2.

(15) The amount of negative campaign advertising was calculated by dividing the number of ads with negative content by the total number of ads. The analysis was based on the number of ads produced, and not on the amount of times these ads were aired. Sources: Lien
Chan’s official website: http://www.lien.org.tw/.
The DPP’s official website:
http://www.dpp.org.tw/

(17) For a list of the chronology of the days
events please refer to; United Daily News,
(18) The project titled “Telephone Survey of
2004 Presidential Election” was sponsored by
the National Science Council (NSC92-2414-H-004-020).
(19) The first referendum question was: “The
People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan
Strait issue be resolved through peaceful
means. If China refuses to withdraw the
missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly
renounce the use of force against us, would you
agree that the government should acquire
more advanced anti-missile weapons to
strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities?”
And the second question was: “Would you
agree that our government should engage in
negotiations with China about the establish-
ment of a “peace and stability” framework for
cross-strait interactions in order to build con-
sensus and for the welfare of the peoples on
both sides?”
(21) Taipei Times, Apr. 8, page 8.

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